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An Autopsy of the Structural
Reform Injunction:
Oops ... It's Still Moving!
MYRIAM GILLES*
In 1978, Owen Fiss wrote that the structural reform injunction "rep-
resents the most visible and perhaps the most ambitious exercise of judi-
cial power -- at times it tries to reconstruct the world."' Professor Fiss
was writing of a legal revolution that began in the 1950s, when federal
courts began to hear cases challenging the deprivation of rights to large
groups of people by state and local institutions, such as schools and pris-
ons.2 In response to findings of constitutional deprivations, courts were
asked to restructure these public institutions in accordance with the com-
mands of the Constitution. The plaintiffs in these cases sought remedies
that went well beyond traditional damages. Arguing that the violations
of their rights could not be cured with mere monetary penalties, these
plaintiffs sought judicial decrees mandating the reformation of various
institutions to bring them into conformity with constitutional
requirements. 3
"Public law litigation,"4 as these suits soon came to be called,
* Associate Professor, Cardozo School of Law. My thanks to Gary Friedman, Risa
Goluboff, Judith Resnik, Stewart Sterk and members of the Cardozo Junior Faculty Workshop for
thoughtfully reading and discussing this paper. To Irwin Stotsky, who convened the conference
that produced this volume: thank you so much for inviting me to participate in this wonderful
event. Thanks also to the other participants, whose papers and presentations were insightful,
provocative and, for me, a reminder of why we do what we do. And, of course, many thanks are
owed to Owen Fiss, whose scholarship and teaching continues to inspire.
1. OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 18 (1978).
2. The birth of the modem structural reform injunction can be traced to Brown v. Bd. of
Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294 (1955), which directed the district courts to implement the right to
a non-segregated education. As Fiss has written, the structural reform injunction "received its
most authoritative formulation in civil rights cases, specifically those involving school
desegregation, and has been legitimated in terms of those cases. Required to defend structural
relief, reference will always be made to Brown v. Board of Education and the duty it imposed on
the courts of the nation to transform dual school systems into constitutionally acceptable forms."
Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, 78 IowA L. REV. 965 (1993).
3. See Fiss, supra note 1, at 87 ("The inadequacy [of cash payments as compensation]
stemmed from considerations much deeper than difficulties in measurement. [It] stemmed from
the group nature of the underlying claim and a belief that only in-kind benefits would effect a
change in the status of the group.") (emphasis in original).
4. This term has been used to refer to a class of cases involving public institutions, such as
school desegregation, environmental hazards, housing discrimination, prison and mental hospital
conditions, and legislative reapportionment. See generally id.
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resulted in "structural reform injunctions," 5 which, in addition to
enjoining the defendant institution from acting in a particular unconstitu-
tional fashion, ordered forward-looking, affirmative steps to prevent
future deprivations.6 In this remedial regime, the trial judge became the
central figure of the entire litigation process by both determining liabil-
ity and then fashioning a decree that would achieve the constitutional or
regulatory purpose.7 In this way, courts and plaintiffs were "cast in an
affirmative, political - activist, if you must - role."8
And for a time, the structural reform injunction loomed large as a
powerful tool for the transformation of social institutions; as Fiss him-
self boldly proclaimed in the early 1970s, the structural reform injunc-
tion "in the years ahead promises to become a central - maybe the
central - mode of constitutional adjudication."9  But today, while
courts continue to supervise a handful of decades-old decrees in areas
such as school desegregation and prison reform, judicially mandated
structural reform injunctions appear to be vestiges of a bygone era.10
Even as early as 1978, Owen Fiss recognized that the "axiomatic status
of Brown" was losing currency and that the country seemed poised for a
5. Owen Fiss introduced the term "structural injunction" as the category of injunction
"which seeks to effectuate the reorganization of an ongoing social institution." Id., at 7.
According to Fiss, the structural injunction is: "The formal medium through which the judiciary
seeks to reorganize ongoing bureaucratic organizations so as to bring them into conformity with
the Constitution." Fiss, supra note 2, at 965.
6. DONALD HOROwrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 6 (1977) (a contemporaneous and
critical observer of structural reform litigation, Professor Horowitz noted in the late 1970s that
"[i]t is no longer even approximately accurate to say that courts exercise only a veto. What is
asked and what is awarded is often the doing of something, not just the stopping of something.").
7. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1284 (1976) (noting that prohibitory injunctive orders proved an inadequate remedy to eliminate
wrongful conduct or conditions, making it necessary for courts to formulate comprehensive,
forward-looking orders for reforming the defendant institution).
8. Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and
the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982).
9. Fiss, supra note 1, at 2 (italics in original).
10. Evidence of the end is everywhere to be seen: On September 25, 2003, Missouri v.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) - a 26-year old, $2 billion case seeking to desegregate Kansas City
public schools that reached the Supreme Court three times - finally ended. The case was closed
when plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their appeal of the district court's ruling that the 35,000-
student district had met its final goal of closing the achievement gap between black and white
students. Ann Bradley, Kansas City Marks End of Desegregation Case, 10/8/03 EDUC. WK. 4
(available at 2003 WL 9607526). Although lawyers for the plaintiffs in Missouri v. Jenkins would
not comment on their reasons for dropping the appeal, many observers believe that the appeal was
sure to lose, especially given that both the Eight Circuit and the Supreme Court had expressed
exasperation that the case had dragged on for so long. See also Tresa Baldas, As Large School
Districts Leave Court Supervision, Critics See Resegregation, NAT. L.J., June 16, 2003, at 4.
(reporting that school districts across the nation are seeking to be released from federal
supervision under decades-old decrees ordering actions taken to desegregate and provide a
"unitary," equal education to all students).
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"period of reconstitution."" l And he was right: There are no contempo-
rary examples of bold, Brown-like reformist judicial enterprises. 2
There are no more "hero judges," to use Fiss's term, 3 at work crafting
decrees that will bring recalcitrant state and local institutions to constitu-
tional heel. The question this article asks is: To what shall we attribute
the apparent death of the structural reform injunction?
One view, an optimistic one, would be that there are no longer any
problems that demand this radical form of relief; that as the paradig-
matic de jure civil rights violations of Brown went by the wayside, so
too did the propriety of this most powerful tool of enforcing constitu-
tional norms. Fiss wondered as much in the 1970s, when he remarked
on "the frail quality of our substantive vision," and wondered whether
we "have lost our confidence in the existence of the values that underlie
the litigation of the 1960's?"'1
Upon reflection, however, I see no reason the structural reform
injunction should wither and die from the lack of raw material: There
continue to exist sufficiently egregious, systemic constitutional issues
that inspire (or could inspire) the requisite breadth of support and depth
of reformist zeal to motor the machinery of the structural reform injunc-
tion.15 Among the examples I discuss are racial profiling and affirma-
11. Fiss, supra note 1, at 5. Professor Abram Chayes, a contemporary and cohort of Fiss,
similarly acknowledged in 1981 that "[t]he long summer of social reform that occupied the middle
third of the century was drawing to a close" by the mid-1970s. Chayes, supra note 8, at 7.
12. This point is distinct from the more remarked-upon "absence of a contrary voice [on the
current Court], the kind that would once have been raised - if usually in dissent - by William J.
Brennan, Jr. or Thurgood Marshall, both of whom retired in the early 1990s." Linda Greenhouse,
The Nation; Will the Court Move to the Right? It Already Has, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2003, at D3.
Greenhouse quotes Stephen J. Wermiel as saying that "Brennan and Marshall would have been
indignant" about the lack of compassion on the Court today, though Wermiel himself views the
problem as "not so much the lack of compassion, but the fact that the court gave no sign that this
was a place that might have been appropriate for compassion." Id.
13. Fiss, supra note 1, at 90. Fiss writes, "It was not reasonable to expect the judges to be
heroes, but the truth of the matter is that many lived up to these unreasonable expectations - they
fought the popular pressures at great personal sacrifice and discomfort. The average judge turned
out to be more heroic than the average legislator (or juror). And it was just this hope that led civil
rights litigators to cast their suits in injunctive form." See also Judith Resnik, For Owen Fiss:
Reflections on the Triumph and the Death of Adjudication, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173, 193 (2003)
(noting that while some describe "judging as a heroic activity," judges themselves have become
discontent with the role of hero, particularly in the workaday cases - as distinct from the "big
case" - that make up much of their docket).
14. Fiss, supra note 1, at 17.
15. I was struck by this thought as I sat at the oral argument of the Michigan affirmative
action cases before the Supreme Court on April 1, 2003 - cases in which plaintiffs asked the Court
to strike down the University of Michigan's admissions programs as unconstitutional and
restructure these programs to conform to constitutional minima. Inside the courthouse, the
breadth of judicial consensus on affirmative action was being put to the test. Outside, on New
Jersey Avenue, the shouts of the crowds revealed the depth of emotion that this issue inspires. See
Tony Mauro, O'Connor Seen As Key in Race Case Debate, 229 N.Y. L.J. 1 (2003) (discussing the
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tive action. I conclude that the structural reform injunction did not die
from a dearth of substantive values.
Moving on, I consider the constitutional objections of federalism
and separation of powers, which have been posed by conservative schol-
ars. I rule them out as causes of death. The Supreme Court has simply
never bought these arguments against structural reform injunctions; even
the Rehnquist Court is (mostly) unfazed by the injunction's incursions
on arguably legislative and state-controlled turf. Constitutionally, doc-
trinally and legally, the structural reform injunction remains viable.
Thus, we must look elsewhere
The answer, I believe, lies in a sort of sub-constitutional, extra-
legal discomfort with the role of judges in institutional reform litiga-
tion. 6 Only twenty years ago, Abram Chayes was delighting in the
dynamism of judges in structural reform cases, applauding their "affirm-
ative, political. . . activist" role.17 But the mood has changed: For a
generation now, candidates for the federal bench have been expected to
ritualistically disavow liberal activism. As a job criterion, anti-activism
is right up there with "objectivity" in the minds of the public, Congress
and, now, the judiciary itself.18
As a bulwark against activism, I conclude, courts have erected bar-
riers, principally in the form of standing requirements, to the institution
of suits aimed at structural reform injunctions. These barriers, nonethe-
less, are themselves porous; they are not so much bars to injunctive
actions as they are tools that courts may use to bar injunctive actions
they do not wish to entertain. They are, in a conservative climate, bul-
warks against liberal activism.
And that raises the final question: Is structural reform litigation
really dead? In this connection, I conclude that a conservative-led effort
to engage in structural reform litigation might be under way right now,
"thousands of students and civil rights leaders demonstrat[ing] outside the Court" during the oral
argument).
16. This discomfort with the role of the judge is most evident in legislation that aims to limit
the ability of litigants to bring claims seeking structural relief. For example, the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 requires exhaustion of a prisoner's administrative remedies before judicial
relief can be sought, and, as such, has led to a sharp drop in suits seeking reform of prison
conditions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2000); 42
U.S.C. § 1997e (2000). See also Ricardo Solano, Jr., Note, Is Congress Handcuffing Our
Courts?, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. (1997) (providing a detailed analysis of the provisions of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act). But efforts to limit judicial discretion reach further than structural
reform litigation. See Rehnquist Criticizes Sentencing Restrictions, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2004, at
A26 (reporting that the Chief Justice was angry with a bill that limits the ability of judges to
impose lighter sentences than specified in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
17. Chayes, supra note 8, at 4.
18. See generally DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND
THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1999).
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epitomized by lawsuits seeking judicial decrees governing the admis-
sions criteria of state-run educational institutions. Over the past decade,
lawsuits brought to challenge affirmative action programs in Mary-
land,' 9 Texas,20 Georgia2' and Michigan 22 have asked courts to use their
injunctive power to halt the defendant schools' use of race as a factor in
admissions 2I and to reconstruct those policies in light of the constitu-
tional requirement of equal protection. In form and substance, these
cases bear an ironic resemblance to Brown and the desegregation move-
ment. So while calls for injunctive relief to restructure public institu-
tions may come from the unlikely quarters of conservative think tanks
and institutes, these cases reveal that the structural reform injunction is
not only alive and well, but may serve an important role in the modem
litigation and political landscape.
I. SUBSTANTIVE PRECONDITIONS FOR STRUCTURAL REFORM:
BREADTH AND DEPTH
History tells us that judicially mandated structural reform occurs
only when two conditions are met, which I refer to as breadth and depth.
First, there must be a broad consensus among members of the elite,
thinking class and like-minded folk24 that some institutionalized practice
is systematically depriving individuals of constitutional rights.2  In
19. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).
20. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
21. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (1 lth Cir. 2001).
22. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), afTd, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
23. These cases must be distinguished from legislation, referenda, or executive actions aimed
at achieving similar results. For example, in 1998, Washington state voters passed Initiative 1-200
banning the use of race as a factor in public employment. See Robert H. Kelley, The Washington
Civil Rights Initiative: The Need for a Meaningful Dialogue, 34 GONZ. L. REV. 81 (1998-99).
Similarly, California voters said yes to Proposition 209, which states: "The state shall not
discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of
race, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin in the operation of public employment, public
education, or public contracting." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31. Governor Jeb Bush's One Florida
Plan, adopted in November 1999 by executive order, discontinues race-conscious affirmative
action within Florida's 10-campus public university system and resembles the plans used by Texas
and California by guaranteeing all applicants in the top twenty percent of Florida's high school
graduates, regardless of standardized test scores, a place in a public university. While these
examples are clearly important, they do not involve private litigants using the federal courts to
restructure public institutions.
24. I mean to suggest that when legal issues have ripened to the point that individuals in the
media, in academia, in law, and in community groups are talking about these issues and seem to
speak with some singularity - it is at that point that the issues have achieved a breadth that makes
them likely candidates for judicial intervention. Justice Thomas had this group in mind when he
wrote: "The majority upholds the Law School's racial discrimination not by interpreting the
people's constitution, but by responding to a faddish slogan of the cognoscenti." Grutter, 123 S.
Ct. at 2350 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
25. Many scholars have recognized that courts are responsive to broad-based consensus and
20031
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other words, for judges to engage in structural reform, the problem has
to be palpable, and support for the remedy has to be broad in the rele-
vant legal/political community.26
The second condition is that this group of people - judges, law-
yers, intellectuals - must view the constitutional violations as intolera-
ble in a just society. To mobilize the judicial machinery of structural
reform, the passion invoked must be deep. Toward those ends, in a sort
of constitutional Powell Doctrine,27 the constitutional values at stake
must be clear, and the objectives must be, if not easily attainable, then at
least clearly imaginable.
These principles are rooted in the recognition that courts, as Justice
are selectively sensitive to political issues. See Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 1971, 2008 (1990) ("The institutional characteristics of the Court suggest that it will be
receptive to two types of political preferences. It will be receptive to durable preferences that
command sustained majoritarian support, and to broad-based transitory preferences that command
intense levels of majoritarian support. Brown v. Board of Education, the case typically offered as
establishing the viability of the traditional model, is better understood as an illustration of the
Supreme Court's selective political sensitivity."); Susan J. Krueger, In Defense of a Political
Court, 9 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 507, 510 (2000) (book review) ("The Brown decision required broad-
based political support and translation of that support by other government officials into highly
effective compliance mechanisms.); Colin Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker:
Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REv. 43, 44-46 (1979)
(asserting that judicial power depends on public legitimacy).
26. Support must be broad, at least in part to ensure that judicial orders for relief are carried
out. In this regard, Brown and the desegregation movement reveal that support for desegregation
was lacking in the communities charged with making appropriate changes: Ten years after the
Brown decision, only 1.2% of black school children attended school with whites in the South.
TERRI JENNINGS PERETrI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT (1999). New York Senator Daniel
Patrick Moynihan noted that the Court's order in Brown was not obeyed for the next 16 years. See
To Authorize Special Assistance for Desegregation Activities: Hearings on S. 1256 Before the
Subcomm. on Educ., Arts & Humanities of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 98th
Congress 7-9 (1983) (statement of Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan on S. 1256, The Emergency
School Aid Act). Desegregation occurred rapidly, however, after Congress and the Executive
became involved by threatening school districts not in compliance with Brown with a loss of
federal education funds. By the end of 1967, 16.9% of black children attended Southern schools
with whites; by the end of 1969, 32% of black children attended Southern schools with whites;
and by 1972, 91.3% of black children attended Southern schools with whites. PaRETr at 58. See
also CHARLES A. JOHNSON & BRADLEY C. CANON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION AND
IMPACT (1984) (noting that judicial declarations are not self-effectuating because judges rely on
lower courts, executive branch officials, and members of the public to interpret and carry out
judicial decisions obediently and properly).
27. In the aftermath of his military experience in Vietnam, Colin Powell decided that his
country should never again be caught in a military quagmire. While Powell was chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, his "Powell Doctrine" shaped the rationale, planning and execution of the
1991 Persian Gulf War: Enter a conflict only when U.S. vital interests are at stake. Use
overwhelming force to ensure swift victory with minimal casualties. Ensure the support of the
American people and the international community. Set specific objectives. And prepare a clear
exit strategy.
Though engaging in structural reform is not necessarily analogous to engaging in war, some
of the same points bear reiteration: ensure the support of the relevant community (breadth) and set
specific objectives so as to maintain that support.
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O'Connor has noted, are "mainly reactive institutions" where "change
comes principally from attitudinal shifts in the population at large" and
in which "rare indeed is the legal victory - in court or legislature -
that is not a careful byproduct of an emerging social consensus."28 A
broad consensus, supported by a depth of emotion, supplies the neces-
sary preconditions of meaningful structural reform litigation.
Brown v. Board of Education9 and its progeny 30 exemplify the
breadth and depth requirements. First, there was broad recognition
amongst the relevant, opinion-shaping community that racial segregation
in public schools was a clear violation of 14th Amendment rights. This
was not a majoritarian movement: The man on the street in segregated
districts wasn't rushing the statehouse to get legislation enacted to rem-
edy the problem of segregation; 31 indeed, many believed segregation to
be appropriate. Rather, scholars, commentators, journalists and lawyers
recognized a pervasive problem that called for aggressive action.3" It is
not so much that the problem was in the air, but that it was in the air that
judges breathe.
Second, the problem of racial segregation inspired passion. The
images of black children entering public school under protection of the
National Guard were stark and compelling. Coupled with the unapo-
logetic visages of Southern governors3 3 and legislators - at both the
28. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE (Craig Joyce ed., 2003).
29. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (segregation of public schools according to race violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). A year later in Brown II, 349 U.S. 294
(1955), the Court directed district courts to take whatever actions were "necessary and proper" to
achieve nondiscriminatory school systems. A decade ago, Michael Klarman pointed out that the
practical impact of Brown is overstated, and that the real hero of the revolution was the spate of
civil rights legislation enacted a decade later. Michael Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the
Civil Rights Movement, 80 U. VA. L. REv. 7 (1994). While I agree with Klarman that the impact
of Brown may be more symbolic than actual, for purposes of this paper, I use Brown as shorthand
for describing a series of escalating moments of judicial intervention in state and local institutions
for the purpose of rooting out race-based discrimination.
30. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Alexander v. Holmes County
Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
31. If the man on the street was rushing to the statehouse, it was more likely to try to get
legislation enacted that would curb the authority of the federal courts in areas such as
desegregation and criminal procedure. However, Congress - part of the relevant community
whose recognition of the problem of racial inequality was necessary for the courts to act in the
first place - did not bend to the will of the populace. Despite vehement public passion and over
fifty court-curbing bills introduced in Congress in the 1950s, only one very modest measure was
passed, which codified and limited the holding in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957),
involving access to government files in a criminal prosecution.
32. See, e.g., J. Skelly Wright, Public School Desegregation: Legal Remedies for De Facto
Segregation, in DE FACTO SEGREGATION AND CivIi RIGHTS: STRUGGLE FOR LEGAL AND SOCIAL
EQUALITY 24 (Oliver Schroeder, Jr. & David T. Smith eds., 1965).
33. Most notably, Governors Orval Faubus of Arkansas and George Wallace of Alabama
2003]
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state and federal level34 - the entire affair took on the classical over-
tones of great drama: There were heroes and villains, problems and
solutions. 3
5
Fiss perceived all this in 1978 when he asked whether we have not
"lost our confidence in the existence of . . . any public values. '36 Fiss
was right to question our nation's commitment to judicial involvement
in the restructuring of public institutions. Without a robust "substantive
vision" of constitutional norms - without breadth and depth of passion
and concern for the reformation of constitutionally suspect institutions -
structural reform litigation will be swallowed up by "doubts about the
role of courts."3 7 The procedural is a function of the substantive.
For the purposes of our autopsy, before we can examine the various
procedural stakes that have been driven through the body of structural
reform litigation, we must ask whether the patient died from a lack of
substantive values. Have the constitutional crises that inspire the
breadth and depth of passion required to support structural reform
injunctions disappeared?
A. Contemporary Constitutional Crises: Racial Profiling and
Affirmative Action
Clearly, there are (and may always be) institutional practices that
violate individuals' constitutional rights.38 The question, however, is
opposed a unitary school system with all the force they had at their disposal. On June 11, 1963,
Governor Wallace assembled a force of 700 state troopers and National Guardsmen to prevent two
black students from enrolling at the University of Alabama. Governor Faubus called out the
Arkansas National Guard to prevent black students from entering the school because if they did,
he said, "[b]lood will run in the streets." JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 229
(1994).
34. Although state governors and legislators are better remembered for their opposition to
desegregation, members of the U.S. Congress also were resistant. For example: Richard Russell
of Georgia, Harry F. Byrd of Virginia, and Strom Thurmond of South Carolina drafted the
"Southern Manifesto," which argued that Brown was "a clear abuse of judicial power" that
encroached on the authority of the states to regulate education. 102 CONG. REc. H4515-16 (daily
ed. Mar. 12, 1956). The Manifesto was signed by 101 of the 128 men representing the states of
the Old Confederacy in Congress, and its signors "pledge[d] [themselves] to use all lawful means
to bring about a reversal of this decision which is contrary to the Constitution." Id.
35. Resistance to desegregation was intense. Some Southern school districts completely
closed their schools to avoid compliance with Brown. Virginia adopted the most extreme
measures, requiring its governor to close any school where school desegregation was
contemplated. See ALEXANDER LEIDHOLDT, STANDING BEFORE THE SHOUTING MOB: LENOIR
CHAMBERS AND VIRGINIA'S MASSIVE RESISTANCE TO PUBLIC-SCHOOL INTEGRATION (1997).
36. Fiss, supra note 1, at 16-17.
37. Id. at 16.
38. Indeed, to continue with the example of Brown and desegregation, many commentators
argue that vestiges of de jure segregation still exist and are still felt by minority children. While
school districts have eliminated the most obvious racial disparities such as the assignment of
students to separate schools on the basis of race, problems that are more difficult to identify
[Vol. 58:143
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whether any contemporary practice inspires the breadth and depth of
passion necessary to support structural reform.
Racial profiling,39 for example, is a law enforcement practice that
in its purest form is widely viewed as a violation of constitutional rights
that ought to be regulated, if not banned (to the extent that's possible).40
Putting aside for the moment the security concerns that have developed
in the wake of September 1 1,4 it is fair to say that there exists a broad
consensus that a purely race-based traffic stop, for example, is simply
wrong. Politicians have derided the practice of racial profiling for
years,42 and the current administration issued a directive banning racial
profiling in federal law enforcement agencies. 43 The breadth require-
remain, such as disparate academic achievement. Many scholars have argued that these
desegregation decrees issued under Brown cannot address more modem problems. See, e.g., Dora
W. Klein, Beyond Brown v. Board of Education: The Need to Remedy the Achievement Gap, 31
J.L. & EDUc. 431 (2002).
39. Definitions abound. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (forbidding
"selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race"); Wesley MacNeil Oliver,
With an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand: Pretextual Stops and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial
Profiling, 74 TuE. L. REV. 1409, 1411 (2000) ("Racial profiling, [is the] use of race as a factor in
determining which offender to prosecute."); Eric Lacy, Michigan State U.: Michigan State U.
Report Examines Racial Profiling, THE STATE NEWS, Aug. 7, 2000, available at 2000 WL
24489055 ("Racial profiling is defined by the Michigan State Police as 'any action taken by a
police officer prior to or during a traffic stop that is based upon racial or ethnic stereotypes and
that has the effect of treating minority motorists differently than non-minority motorists.'").
40. See David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While Black"
Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 276 (1999); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, With an Evil Eye and an
Unequal Hand: Pretextual Stops and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial Profiling, 74 TUL. L. REV.
1409, 1410 nn.l-4 (2000).
41. For a criticism of ethnic and religious profiling, even after the September I attacks, see
Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413
(2002).
42. For example, during the three 2000 presidential debates, Vice President Al Gore promised
that if elected, his first act as President would be to issue an executive order banning racial
profiling. See Richard L. Berke, This Time, More Accord Than Discord, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
2000, at Al. More surprisingly, then Texas Governor George W. Bush responded that while he
did not want to "federalize" the local police, he did agree that something needed to be done about
racial profiling. Id.
43. See Press Release, U. S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Issues Policy Guidance to
Ban Racial Profiling, (June 17, 2003) (available at 2003 WL 21391467). In February 2001 -
notably, before September 11 - President Bush directed Attorney General John Ashcroft to
review the use of race by federal law enforcement agents and to "develop specific
recommendations to end racial profiling." The Department then undertook a study of the policies
and practices of federal law enforcement agencies to determine the nature and extent of racial
profiling. Two years later, the President issued a ban on racial profiling by federal law
enforcement agencies - including the FBI, the Secret Service, the Drug Enforcement
Administration and the Department of Homeland Security - but included exceptions permitting
use of race and ethnicity to combat potential terrorist attacks. The new policy prohibits the use of
"generalized stereotypes" based on race or ethnicity, and allows officers to consider them only as
part of a specific description or tip from an informant. See Mike Allen, Bush Issues Ban On
Racial Profiling; Policy Makes Exceptions for Security, WASH. POST, June 19, 2003, at A 14.
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ment appears satisfied.
Depth is another matter. Even in the pre-September 11 world, it
was not clear whether the level of passion generated by the issue of
racial profiling was sufficient to support structural reform. It could be
that many people believed racial profiling to be a problem, but not one
that merited dramatic action.' There also seems to be a sense of fatal-
ism (or realism) afoot here: Calls for reform are tempered by the view
that "mild" racial profiling is endemic to law enforcement.45 Perhaps
there simply weren't enough incidents of extreme forms of racial profil-
ing to engender the depth of passion necessary for more radical reform
through a structural injunction.46
In any event, since 9/11 the passions on this issue have certainly
cooled.4 7 Today, even those on the left acknowledge that racial profiling
44. There was one attempt at structural reform litigation that gained some traction on this
issue. In 1999, New Jersey released a study showing that its state troopers engaged in racial
profiling by stopping disparate numbers of minority drivers on the New Jersey Turnpike. See
OFF. OF THE ATr'y GEN. OF N.J., INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE POLICE REVIEW TEAM
REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING (Apr. 20, 1999), available at http://
www.state.nj.us/lps/intm_419.pdf. Ensuing litigation resulted in a consent decree in which
troopers agreed to record the race of stopped motorists, and submit to training, among other
things. Id.; see also Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Pretext Stops and Racial
Profiling After Whren v. United States: The New York and New Jersey Responses Compared, 63
ALB. L. REV. 725, 744 (2000) (discussing how African-Americans were "disproportionately
targeted" by New Jersey state troopers for traffic enforcement).
45. Again, while the Bush Administration deserves some credit for issuing the ban on racial
profiling, the directive is riddled with exceptions that make clear the administration's view that
some form of racial profiling is necessary, and will happen anyway. For example, according to
the Justice Department's policy directives to federal agencies on how to institute the ban, law
enforcement officials "may continue to rely upon specific descriptions of the physical appearance
of criminal suspects, if a specific suspect description exists in that particular case," and "may use
race or ethnicity only in extremely narrow circumstances - when there is trustworthy
information, relevant to the locality or time frame at issue, that links persons of a particular race or
ethnicity to an identified criminal incident, scheme or organization." Furthermore, in light of the
events of September 11, federal law enforcement officers may "include consideration of factors
such as travel patterns, visits to countries known to harbor or support terrorist operations,
suspicious identity documents, the country that issued the person a passport, sources of support,
and other probative factors" in investigating terrorist threats. See Press Release, supra note 43.
46. The Justice Department, in a recent survey of federal operations, concluded that racial
profiling did not appear to be "a systemic problem," and that a federal ban on the practice was
almost metaphorical. According to a White House spokesman, "this is about stopping the abuses
of a few, and the action ... should only strengthen the public's confidence that the vast majority
of law enforcement officials have earned and deserve credit for the job they do in protecting
Americans." Eric Lichtblau, Bush Guidelines Bar Use of Racial Profiling, SAN DIGO UNION-
TRIB., June 18, 2003, at Al. Critics of the ban agree that it is mainly symbolic: According to the
ACLU, "This policy acknowledges racial profiling as a national concern, but it does nothing to
stop it .... It's largely a rhetorical statement. The administration is trying to soften its image, but
it's smoke and mirrors." Id.
47. See, e.g., Susan Sachs, In the Search for Suspects, Sensitivities About Profiling, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2001, at D7; Henry Weinstein et al., After the Attack: Law Enforcement Racial
Profiling Gains Support as Search Tactic, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2001, at Al; Sam Howe
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may serve some legitimate law enforcement goals, and the country is
surely in no mood to force reformist changes on police departments.48
Affirmative action, by contrast, is a context in which the requisite
depth of emotion abounds, but breadth of support for institutional trans-
formation may be lacking. Conservatives believe that affirmative action
in admissions, as it is practiced by state educational institutions, is an
unconstitutional practice, much as the plaintiffs alleged in Brown. And,
like the civil rights leaders in Brown, the leaders of the anti-affirmative
action brigade look to the courts to establish a regime that will ensure
constitutional equity. There is a great deal of passion here (not to men-
tion irony), as those who oppose affirmative action are an inspired lot,
full of emotional arguments.4 9
But here, in contrast to the racial profiling example, what may be
lacking is a broad-based acknowledgment in the relevant community
that there is any constitutional problem with the practice of affirmative
Verhovek, Americans Give In to Race Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2001, at ]A; Michael
Kinsley, When is Racial Profiling Okay?, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2001, at B07; Vikram David
Amar, Security When Racial Profiling Is Appropriate, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at M2; Jason L.
Riley, 'Racial Profiling' and Terrorism, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2001, at A22; Kay Lazar,
Terrorism Ushers in New Racial Perspectives, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 28, 2001, at 8.
48. Since September 11, the federal government has adopted a broad strategy of targeting
non-citizens residing in the United States for special scrutiny if they come from Middle Eastern
nations where anti-American terrorist organizations have been known to operate. While some
commentators criticize this policy, many more seem to believe these tactics are necessary in the
wake of the terrorist attack. See, e.g., Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 1575 (2002); Liam Braber, Comment, Korematsu's Ghost: A Post-September I 1th Analysis
of Race and National Security, 47 VILL. L. REV. 451 (2002); Huang Vu, Note, Us Against Them:
The Path to National Security Is Paved by Racism, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 661 (2002).
49. California businessman Ward Connerly, for example, has championed initiatives and
litigation to dismantle state-run programs that taken account of race in hiring or admissions.
Connerly gained national attention for his successful campaigns to stop the use of racial and
gender preferences at the University of California and, later, statewide with Proposition 209.
More recently, Connerly stumped for the "Racial Privacy Initiative," a.k.a. Proposition 54, which
would have prohibited public agencies from collecting racial data about Californians; the measure
failed, but Connerly's quest for a "color-blind" society continues. Another passionate voice
against affirmative action has been Justice Clarence Thomas, whose dissenting opinion in Grutter
v. Bollinger argued that affirmative action creates more harm than good: "The Law School
tantalizes unprepared students with the promise of a University of Michigan degree and all of the
opportunities that it offers. These overmatched students take the bait, only to find that they cannot
succeed in the cauldron of competition." 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2359 (2003). He then cited two articles
from education journals as "growing evidence" that integrated schools "actually impair leaming
among black students." Id. Justice Thomas's critique of affirmative action is part of his broader
attack on the reasoning that underlies the Court's decision in Brown and its progeny. See Clarence
Thomas, An Afro-American Perspective: Toward a "Plain Reading" of the Constitution - The
Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 How. L.J. 983, 991 (1987)
(arguing that Brown's rationale that blacks were psychologically harmed by de jure segregation
was the "great flaw" in a decision that was correct in its result, making the case a "missed
opportunity," like all its "progeny, whether they involve busing, affirmative action, or
redistricting").
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action. Take Grutter v. Bollinger5" and Gratz v. Bollinger,5' the recent
cases challenging the use of race as a factor in admissions to the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School and undergraduate program, respectively.
Every aspect of the twin cases, from the district court proceedings to the
disparate rulings by the Supreme Court, reflects the lack of broad con-
sensus concerning affirmative action programs in school admissions.
The district court in Grutter heard fifteen days of testimony on such
matters as the value of diversity in education and the need for a "critical
mass" of minority students on campus.52 Based on this "evidence," the
district court found the law school's admissions policy
unconstitutional. 53
In Gratz, another district court judge in Michigan reached the con-
trary conclusion, holding that a racially and ethnically diverse student
body produces significant educational benefits and that the University of
Michigan's undergraduate admissions program was a narrowly tailored
means of achieving the university's interest.54 The Sixth Circuit in
Grutter was likewise sharply divided, as four judges dissented from a
nine-judge en banc opinion reversing the district court.55  And the
Supreme Court betrayed its own ambivalence by splitting the affirmative
action baby - upholding the law school's admissions policy, while strik-
ing down the admissions policy in the undergraduate case.5 6
The diversity of views represented by these judicial decisions
reflects the diversity of views in society more broadly. As one test, take
the ninety amicus briefs filed in the Supreme Court in the Michigan
cases - seventy-four in support of the constitutionality of affirmative
action, fifteen against, and five taking neither side. The number of
briefs, the range of institutions represented, and breadth of interests said
50. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
51. 123 S. Ct. 2144 (2003)
52. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
53. Specifically, the district court held that achieving a diverse student body is not a
compelling state interest because (1) it was not bound by Justice Powell's conclusion in Bakke,
and (2) achieving a diverse student body cannot be a compelling state interest because the
Supreme Court has suggested that the only such interest is remedying specific instances of
discrimination. Id. at 847-48.
54. See 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 824, 827 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
55. 288 F.3d 732 (2002). Chief Judge Martin delivered the opinion of the court, in which
Judges Daughtrey, Moore, Cole, and Clay joined. Judge Moore wrote a separate concurring
opinion, in which Judges Daughtrey, Cole and Clay joined. Judge Clay wrote a separate
concurring opinion in which Daughtrey, Moore and Cole joined. Judge Boggs wrote a dissent in
which Judge Siler joined in part, and which Judge Batchelder joined in whole. Judges Batcher
and Gilman also wrote separate dissenting opinions.
56. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (finding the law school admissions policy constitutional),
and Gratz, 123 S. Ct. 2144 (finding the undergraduate admissions policy unconstitutional).
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to be at stake - all of these factors reveal that affirmative action poli-
cies remain deeply controversial.
There is simply no broad agreement among judges, lawyers, aca-
demics or politicians about the propriety of affirmative action pro-
grams. 57 So this issue, which inspires great passion among supporters
and detractors and is arguably one of the most important domestic issues
facing Americans,58 fails the breadth test because, in the end, there is no
clear consensus about whether affirmative action in admissions is a con-
stitutional violation.
The lesson to be gleaned is that there is nothing endemic to our
times that prevents a problem of constitutional dimension from attaining
the breadth of recognition or inspiring the depth of commitment to
engage the machinery of structural reform litigation. Whether the depth
seems lacking on racial profiling, or the breadth seems lacking on
affirmative action, there is no reason to believe that contemporary public
values are somehow too frail to support structural reform litigation.
Both these contemporary issues have engendered serious attempts at
structural reform. And while none of these efforts have produced
wholesale judicial reformation of local institutions, one can easily imag-
ine police departments and college admissions boards operating under
complex rules established and imposed through federal injunctive
orders.
As coroners conducting an autopsy, then, we have deduced that the
lack of substantive values could not have caused the demise of the struc-
tural reform injunction. We must therefore look elsewhere to divine the
cause of death. In particular, we must consider whether constitutional
principles are to blame.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CAUSES: SEPARATION OF POWERS
AND FEDERALISM
Constitutional principles tell us that, juristically, the structural
reform injunction remains viable. The state of the law today is that the
57. Compare WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK CURTIS BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG
TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1998)
(asserting that race-sensitive admission policies for colleges and universities are successful and
benefit society as a whole) with Robert M. Berdahl, Policies of Opportunity: Fairness and
Affirmative Action in the Twenty-First Century, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 115, 118 (2000)
(criticizing universities' use of race because it distracts from merit).
58. Indeed, by granting certiorari in Gratz v. Bollinger while the case was still pending in the
Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court implicitly acknowledged that the issue of affirmative action
satisfied the requirements of Supreme Court Rule II requiring that for a petition for writ of
certiorari to be granted prior to judgment, the case must be "of such imperative public importance
as to justify deviation from normal appellate practice and to require immediate determination in
this Court." See SUP. CT. R. 1I.
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sweeping and detailed judicial decrees at issue in the major school bus-
ing, prison reform and death penalty administration cases, among other
areas, do not violate separation of powers principles, or principles of
federalism.
Not only do structural reform injunctions remain legally viable, but
there are longstanding structural reform litigations that are ongoing. The
typical ongoing school desegregation case commenced twenty or more
years ago and concerns the continuing efforts of a local school district to
comply with the complex decrees of a federal court, which are aimed at
implementing the broad 14th Amendment-based dictates of Brown II
and its progeny.59 The typical ongoing prison case is no younger, con-
cerning adherence to 1970s decrees establishing constitutional minima
in prison conditions.60
A. The Federalism Objection
Far from pulling the plug on the complicated machinery of these
structural reform injunctions, contemporary courts - including the
Rehnquist Court - have rolled up their sleeves and assessed the propri-
ety of specific remedial measures on a decidedly case-by-case basis.6'
Indeed, the Supreme Court has not sustained any broadside constitu-
tional challenges to structural reform injunctions; challenges mounted on
federalism and separation of powers grounds have succeeded only in
causing the Court to warn lower court judges to be mindful of state and
congressional prerogatives.62 As one critic of the Court's desegregation
59. It is difficult to determine how many school districts are currently under court-supervised
desegregation orders, in part because many school districts have recently sought to have such
orders vacated. See supra note 10. See also Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public
Remedies: A Tale of Two Kansas Cities, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 475, 480 n.16 (citing statistics from
the Department of Justice indicating that approximately 100 school districts operate under
"general" orders to desegregate); DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
AND THE LAW 166 (1995) (estimating that 695 school districts operate under formal school
desegregation plans).
60. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & ROGER A. HANSON, THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
ON PRISONS AND JAILS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS AND A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 12, 13-
17 (John J. Dilulio ed., 1990) (discussing court orders that have resulted in a restructuring of
prison life).
61. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (discussing
the limits on federal courts' remedial power, and noting that "one vehicle can carry only a limited
amount of baggage"); Milliken v. Bradley 1, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (finding that a district court
had exceeded its authority in fashioning inter-district relief where surrounding school districts had
not been guilty of any constitutional violation); and Milliken v. Bradley II, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81
(1977) (articulating a three-part framework to guide courts in the exercise of their remedial
authority).
62. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) (warning federal judges against
"wad[ing] into this complex arena" of prison management); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
351 (1981) (again warning federal courts to "bear in mind that their inquiries 'spring from
constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather than a
[Vol. 58:143
20031 STRUCTURAL REFORM INJUNCTION
jurisprudence has complained, "this concern about federalism appears to
be nothing more than that - a concern... [T]he Court does not appear
to have ever invalidated a structural remedy on the ground that it
improperly intruded upon the proper authority of state and local
institutions."63
A case in point is Missouri v. Jenkins 111,64 where a 5-4 Court
reversed a provision in a district court order that would have required
across-the-board salary increases for teachers and staff.65 The rejection
of this particular remedial provision was based on the majority's view
that the purpose of the ordered salary increase - to stave off white
flight - was insufficiently related to the constitutional violation.66
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority in Jenkins III declined to heed the
exhortation of Justice Thomas to "put the genie back in the bottle" '67 and
announce that the Constitution simply precludes structural reform
injunctions. 68
Specifically, Justice Thomas would have stricken on constitutional
grounds the complex set of interlocking decrees developed over eighteen
years that governed the Kansas City schools. 69 Relying on principles of
federalism, he argued that education is quintessentially a matter for local
court's idea of how best to operate"' the defendant institution); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S.
576, 584 (1984) (reaffirming "the very limited role that courts should play in the administration of
detention facilities."). See also Milliken 1I, 433 U.S. at 280-81 (district courts "must take into
account the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with
the constitution.").
63. John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent Remedial
Authority of Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1133 n.83 (1996) (citing Jenkins III and
Milliken I as cases invalidating certain elements of a desegregation remedy on non-constitutional
grounds).
64. Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins III), 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 91-96. Specifically, the Court found that the salary increase - whose stated remedy
was to increase the desegregative attractiveness of the district (i.e., to stave white flight) - was an
interdistrict remedy, where no inter-district violation had been found. Id.
67. Id. at 123 (Thomas, J., concurring).
68. In urging a limitation on court intervention, Justice Thomas stated, "[m]otivated by our
worthy desire to eradicate segregation, however, we have disregarded [the principle of limited
judicial authority] and given the courts unprecedented authority to shape a remedy in equity." Id.
at 124. As examples of the ever-expanding equitable authority of the courts in this area, Justice
Thomas cited orders to desegregate faculty and staff according to specific mathematical ratios,
ordering busing, setting racial targets for school populations, altering attendance zones, and the
use of compensatory education programs paid for by the state. Id. Characterizing these as
examples of "judicial overreaching," Justice Thomas argued that neither history nor constitutional
structure can support such broad remedial authority. Id. at 125.
69. Interestingly, Justice Thomas raises the Eleventh Amendment only in a footnote. Id. at
132 n.5. He notes that the order for salary increases, as well as the entire desegregation plan,
come "perilously close to abrogating the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity from federal
money damages awards." Id.
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authorities,7" and as such, "a structural reform decree eviscerates a
State's discretionary authority over its own program and budgets and
forces state officials to reallocate state resources and funds to the deseg-
regation plan at the expense of other citizens." 7'
While Justice Thomas was curiously alone on the Court in 1995 in
seeking to eliminate structural reform injunctions on federalism
grounds,7" he has much company in conservative academia. The basic
federalism argument is that court-ordered structural reform injunctions
irrevocably alter the relationship between the federal and state govern-
ments. Specifically, when a federal court issues a structural reform
injunction ordering a state or local institution to undergo affirmative,
reformative changes, the court displaces the state or local officials and
bodies responsible for managing these institutions in a manner that
offends federalism principles7 3
Professor Fiss was fairly dismissive of these federalism arguments,
which were first leveled against structural reform injunctions by scholars
in the 1960s and 1970s. While acknowledging that "the federalism issue
has haunted the Supreme Court throughout its history," 74 Fiss nonethe-
less believed that objections to structural reform injunctions rooted in
federalism reflect nothing more than "a desire to insulate the status quo
from judicial interference," whereas the real critique, he wrote, was
directed "toward the activism of judges. 75 While Fiss recognized that
70. Id. at 131, citing Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977) (pointing out
that "local autonomy of school districts is a vital national tradition.").
71. Id.
72. Justice Thomas received some unconvincing support from Justice O'Connor, who
concurred in the majority opinion, but in doing so noted that school desegregation cases are
"concerned with the 'elimination of the discrimination inherent in the dual school systems, not
with myriad factors of human existence which can cause discrimination in a multitude of ways on
racial, religious, or ethnic grounds."' Id. at 112, citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22 (1971). These "myriad factors," she wrote, "are not readily corrected by
judicial intervention, but are best addressed by the representative branches." Id. Justice
O'Connor further opined that legislatures are better-suited because there are constitutional limits
on "the judiciary's institutional capacity to prescribe palliatives for social ills," and that the
"unfortunate fact of racial imbalance and bias in our society, however pervasive or invidious, does
not admit of judicial intervention absent a constitutional violation." Id. So while it seems that
Justices O'Connor and Thomas are in agreement that there are remedies that the federal courts
cannot order because of the "limited judicial role" envisioned by Article III, Justice O'Connor's
concurrence does not go so far as to argue that structural reform remedies as a whole violate
federalism or separation of powers principles.
73. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 63; Colin Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker:
Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 63 (1979) (critiquing
the capacity of judges to manage structural reform cases, particularly where competent state and
local agencies have been established to deal with the issue).
74. OWEN Fiss, THE TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 257
(1993).
75. Owen Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1159-60 (1977) (referring to the Supreme
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some members of the Court believed "a vital principle of federalism was
threatened by the injunctive suit,"7 6 he was reluctant to accept that state
interests in these cases were "in any sense vital."77 To Fiss, it was sim-
ple: "[T]he states are bound by federal law, including the Bill of Rights,
and the ultimate power to determine the consistency of the state laws
with these superior federal norms is allocated to a federal court, the
Supreme Court of the United States."78
B. Separation of Powers Objections
Conservative scholars have also argued that separation of powers
principles are violated when federal courts engage in the structural
reform of local institutions. The argument is that when countermajori-
tarian courts perform tasks better left to the political branches, they
threaten to circumvent democratic decision-making processes.7 9 Profes-
sor John Choon Yoo has argued that the "essential flaw" of structural
reform litigation is seen when the remedy needed to correct a constitu-
tional violation lies outside a court's traditional remedial power.80 At
that point, according to Yoo, "separation of powers principles require
that the answer come from the political branches" rather than the
courts.8 '
These separation of powers objections are echoed in Justice
Thomas's opinion in Missouri v. Jenkins 111.82 While conceding that the
district court's order requiring salary increases was "not a case of one
branch of Government encroaching on the prerogatives of another,"83
Justice Thomas nonetheless contended that the district court engaged in
functions that involved a legislative or executive power in violation of
basic constitutional principles. Specifically, the district court had exer-
Court's decision in Rizzo v. Goode); see also infra text accompanying note 109 (discussing the
equitable standing doctrine as applied in Rizzo v. Goode).
76. Fiss, supra note 2, at 63.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 273, 408 (1977) (arguing that when courts issue structural injunctions,
they essentially "substitute their own views for those of legislative bodies"); Paul Mishkin,
Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 958 (1978) (arguing that
structural reform injunctions "can be used essentially to bypass majoritarian political controls");
Robert Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 661, 664 (1978) (arguing that separation of powers limits the ability of the judiciary to
undertake executive or legislative functions when ordering relief against state officials).
80. Yoo, supra note 63, at 1123.
81. Id. at 1123-24.
82. 515 U.S. 70 (1994).
83. Id. at 132 (Thomas, J. concurring) ("There is no difference between courts running school
systems or prisons and courts running Executive Branch agencies.").
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cised "the legislative power to tax .... budget[], staff[], [make] educa-
tional decisions, in judgments about the location and esthetic quality of
the schools, and [had engaged] in administrative oversight and monitor-
ing."84 According to Justice Thomas, these were "fundamentally politi-
cal decisions"85 properly left to the legislative branch.
Here again, Professor Fiss has taken up and rejected the separation
of powers arguments leveled against structural reform litigation.
Observing that critics of structural reform see adjudication in essentially
private terms 86 - viewing the purpose of civil lawsuits as the resolution
of discrete private disputes - Fiss has consistently advocated a more
public vision of adjudication. According to Fiss, civil litigation is "an
institutional arrangement for using state power to bring a recalcitrant
reality closer to our chosen ideals. 87 We turn to courts not only to
resolve private, binary problems, but also to help us sort through and
begin the hard work of solving broader, multi-dimensional problems.
For Fiss, then, courts are the proper branch to engage in the reformist
enterprise envisioned by structural reform litigation because this form of
"adjudication is the social process by which judges give meaning to our
public values. '88 Federal courts on the Fiss model must play a central
role in articulating public and constitutional values. To the extent that
this role also requires broad remedies to give meaning to those values,
Fiss saw no separation of powers problem.
On the public law vision that Fiss advocates, separation of powers
concerns are misplaced: Litigation is just one of many paths to struc-
tural reform. And courts are certainly, pursuant to this model, the pre-
ferred source of the constitutional values that underlie efforts to reform
state and local institutions. After all, these values are often counterma-
joritarian, particularly in the arena of civil rights. In the Fissian view,
there is a fox-guarding-the-chicken-coop problem when the political
branches assume responsibility for the constitutional operation of state
and local institutions:
If nothing more is at stake than the formulation of "public policy,"
... then it is fair to assume that the nonrepresentative character of the
judiciary is a vice. But if the focus shifts to the civil rights injunc-
tion, and either the minority-group orientation or the constitutional
basis of the substantive right, then the nonrepresentative character of
the judiciary becomes a virtue rather than a vice. Constitutional
rights are supposed to be countermajoritarian, and those emanating
84. Id. at 133.
85. Id.
86. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
87. Fiss, supra note 1, at 56.
88. Id.
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from the Equal Protection Clause particularly SO.89
In the end, whatever the merits of the constitutional attacks by crit-
ics such as Justice Thomas or Professor Yoo, or the constitutional
defenses proffered by Owen Fiss and others, the fact is that neither fed-
eralism nor separation of powers challenges have yet to topple a struc-
tural reform injunction. We press forward, therefore, in our search for
the cause of death.
III. DISCOMFORT WITH THE ROLE OF JUDGES IN STRUCTURAL
REFORM LITIGATION
The structural reform injunction did not die from lack of substan-
tive values or from constitutional attack. Rather, I attribute the injunc-
tion's demise to extra-legal, subconstitutional causes; in other words,
political reasons. In particular, the structural reform injunction has dis-
appeared from the contemporary sociolegal landscape because of the
essentially political fear of judicial activism.90 The concern is that judges
engaged in structural reform improperly substitute their own views for
those of officials and citizens within the offending institution or
community.
Neither the top-down concern expressed by the neo-federalists, nor
the functional concerns of separation of powers jurisprudence captures
the core, and very deep, critique that judges exercising broad, long-term
remedial authority over local institutions are playing God: making rules
and issuing orders based solely or largely on their own personal moral
views. As one scholar writes, "[B]y assuming such powers, courts
threaten to transform themselves into roving commissions whose aim is
to do the right thing, rather than to interpret and enforce the law." 9'
Fiss foresaw more than two decades ago that popular criticism of
structural reform litigation would come to focus less on the civil rights
and other substantive issues that were the subject of complex injunc-
tions, and would increasingly be directed "toward the activism of
judges. 92  And indeed, the issue of judicial activism has gained
89. Id. at 60.
90. As Judith Resnik points out, judges themselves have become increasingly anti-activist.
Resnik points to such examples as the "anti-adjudication elements" of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (which are promulgated by judges), the "devolution of judicial power" to thousands of
non-Article III decision makers, and the increased lobbying by the federal judiciary against the
creation of legal rights in federal courts to remedy injuries to consumers, veterans and victims of
gender-based violence. See Resnik, supra note 13; see also Judith Resnik, Trial as Error,
Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article 111, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 949-99
(2003).
91. Yoo, supra note 63, at 1140-41.
92. Fiss, supra note 1, at 1159-60.
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extraordinary political traction in the ensuing quarter-century. The term
"judicial activism" itself suggests unelected demigods driven by politi-
cal positions on such hot-button issues as abortion, school prayer, gay
marriage and affirmative action.93 The popular conception posits battal-
ions of activist judges, unmoored by the "text, structure or logic of the
Constitution, '9 4 waving their injunctive wands to recast state and local
institutions according to their whim.
The zeitgeist of our times is anti-activism. So fearful have we
become of a powerful judiciary that we now vet candidates for the fed-
eral bench based primarily on their disavowal of views associated with
activism.95 Our current President has stated bluntly that his nominees to
the federal bench will be conservatives who "clearly understand[ ] [that]
the role of a judge is to interpret the law, not to legislate from the bench
... [that] the courts exist to exercise not the will of men, but the judg-
ment of law." 96 Indeed, the political appeal of the anti-activism position
is so great that it has been adopted by liberal politicians who, in any
other era, could be expected to appreciate the Fissian vision of a
dynamic and constructive judiciary.97
93. Of course, while these are some of the hot-button issues of our generation, each era has
had its own. The Marshall Court, the Lochner Court and the Warren Court - the most "activist"
of the prior Courts - were also accused of having "enacted the agenda of identifiable political
constituencies and, usually, of a political party" in deciding cases involving civil rights, criminal
procedure, property rights and due process. See Michael S. Greve, The Judiciary: A Conservative
View of the Court, NAT'L REV., June 16, 2003, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/
comment/comment-greve06O6O3.asp.
94. Michael Paulsen, Book Review: Straightening Out the Confirmation Mess, 105 YALE L.J.
549, 552 (1995).
95. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, Unpicking Pickering in 2002: Some Thoughts on the Politics
of Lower Federal Court Selection and Confirmation, 36 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 695, 701-02 (2003)
(discussing Bush Sr.'s evaluation of then-District Court Judge Jose A. Cabranes' record as a
potential Second Circuit nominee). A memo on Cabranes conceded that his "judicial writings are
scholarly, reflecting a lucid style and careful attention to detail. He is seldom reversed."
Nevertheless, the memo maintained that "Judge Cabranes' academic writings and judicial
opinions mark him as a judicial activist with deeply held views regarding the power of the courts
to bring about social change." Id. at 701 (quoting Lee Liberman, Subject Name Files, Box 40964,
Cabranes, Jose A. [CF OAID 02081], George Bush Library, College Station, Texas). Not
surprisingly, Cabranes was not promoted by George Bush, but by Bill Clinton in 1994. Id. at 702.
96. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President During Federal Judicial Appointees
Announcement (May 9, 2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/printl
20010509-3.html. In his state of the union address on January 20, 2004, the President warned that
"activist judges have begun redefining marriage by court order, without regard for the will of the
people and their elected representatives. On an issue of such great consequence, the people's
voice must be heard. If judges insist on forcing their arbitrary will upon the people, the only
alternative left to the people would be the constitutional process. Our nation must defend the
sanctitiy of marriage." Many would argue that the position taken by the Massachusetts court is
not a feat of activism, but an exercise in statutory and constitutional interpretation.
97. For example, Patrick Leahy, as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, has accused
the Rehnquist Court of "judicial activism of the most dangerous, anti-democratic kind." Greve,
supra note 93.
STRUCTURAL REFORM INJUNCTION
Anti-activism is an attitude. Beginning in the late 1970s, courts
gave vent to this attitude by erecting procedural barriers to the com-
mencement of suits aimed at structural reform injunctions. These proce-
dural barriers, over time, have all but denied litigants the ability to bring
claims in federal court that challenge widespread and systemic practices
that violate individual rights and constitutional guarantees.
A. Procedural Barriers to Liberal Activism: The Equitable
Standing Doctrine
The Supreme Court has decided, on procedural grounds, a number
of cases that restrict the availability of private equitable remedies for
constitutional violations. Of particular importance, the Court has denied
standing to plaintiffs who, it claimed, failed to meet the requirements of
causation, redressability and injury-in-fact.98 The Rehnquist Court in
particular has relied heavily on Article III standing doctrine to limit
plaintiffs' ability to adjudicate broad constitutional and statutory
claims.9 9 Among the restrictive devices employed by the Court is the
"equitable standing doctrine."
Under the equitable standing doctrine, a private plaintiff has stand-
ing to seek injunctive relief against unconstitutional practices only if he
can show to a "virtual certainty" that he will suffer similar injury in the
future. The Court first began to articulate this new standard for injunc-
tive relief in the mid-1970s in a pair of cases challenging police prac-
tices. O'Shea v. Littleton1°° was a class action brought on behalf of the
citizens of Cairo, Illinois, against the state lower-court judges, alleging
willful discrimination in sentencing determinations and other practices,
including the imposition of excessive bail and jury fee practices.' 0
98. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975) (denying standing to plaintiffs
challenging exclusionary zoning ordinance for failure to show a "substantial probability" that,
absent the zoning, they could afford housing in the area); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 43 (1976) (denying standing to poor people challenging IRS regulations for failure to
prove that enjoining the regulations would cause hospitals to restore the amount of care to
previous levels); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (finding plaintiffs challenging government conveyance of property to
religious college lacked standing because unable to show injury-in-fact); Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (finding group of mentally retarded citizens could not
seek redress against state officials in federal courts because of 1 th Amendment prohibition);
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984) (denying standing to parents of African-American
public school students who alleged that tax-exempt status granted to private schools resulted in
race discrimination affirming that the "federal court ... is not the proper forum to press general
complaints about the way in which government goes about its business") (internal quotations
omitted).
99. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
100. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
101. Specifically, "[t]hese judges allegedly set bond in criminal cases without regard to the
facts of individual cases and as punishment, and not merely to assure the appearance of defendants
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According to the complaint, these illegal practices were deliberately
applied to black citizens - more disturbingly, to those black citizens
engaged in an economic boycott of businesses that refused to serve
blacks. 1o2
The O'Shea plaintiffs sought no damages, but requested the uncon-
stitutional practices be enjoined. While the lower courts were in disa-
greement over the question of whether defendants were protected from
suit by judicial immunity,"°3 the Supreme Court took a different
approach," finding that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek federal equi-
table relief because they had failed to allege injury - either actual or
threatened - sufficient to warrant judicial intrusion into the state crimi-
nal justice system. °5 The Court held that even if plaintiffs had suffered
past injury as a result of these alleged practices, "[plast exposure to ille-
gal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regard-
ing injunctive relief. . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present
adverse effects."" °  Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall dissented,
at trial; impose[d] higher sentences and harsher conditions of sentencing on black than on white
citizens; and require[d] respondents and members of their class, when charged with violations of
city ordinances which carry fines and possible jail penalties, to pay for a trial by jury if the fine
[could not]be paid." Id. at 506 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 491. These minorities also "encouraged others to participate in an economic
boycott of city merchants who [they] consider[ed] have engaged in racial discrimination." Id.
This economic boycott had created "a great deal of tension and antagonism among the white
citizens and officials of Cairo." Id. Justice Douglas remarked in his dissent that "Cairo, Illinois,
is boiling with racial conflicts." Id. at 506 (Douglas, J., dissenting). These tensions were the
alleged motive behind the discriminatory practices in O'Shea.
103. The District Court dismissed based on immunity doctrine, but the Court of Appeals
reversed, finding that immunity "did not forbid the issuance of injunctions against judicial officers
if it is alleged and proved that they have knowingly engaged in conduct intended to discriminate
against a cognizable class of persons on the basis of race." Id. at 492. Furthermore, the Court of
Appeals noted that any practical difficulties with issuing an injunction were overblown; in this
regard, the Court suggested that injunctive relief "might include a requirement of periodic reports
of various types of aggregate data on actions on bail and sentencing." Id. at 493 n. 1. The lone
Court of Appeals dissenter argued:
[A] federal district court has no power to supervise and regulate by mandatory
injunction the discretion which state court judges may exercise within the limits of
the powers vested in them by law, and that any relief contemplated by the majority
holding which might be applicable to the pattern and practice alleged, if proven,
would subject the petitioners to the continuing supervision of the District Court, the
necessity of defending their motivations in each instance when the fixing of bail or
sentence was challenged by a Negro defendant as inconsistent with the equitable
relief granted, and the possibility of a contempt citation for failure to comply with
the relief awarded.
Id.
104. "This Court now decides for the first time in the course of this litigation that the
complaint is deficient because it does not state a 'case or controversy' within the meaning of Art.
III." Id. at 506 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 493.
106. Id. at 495-96. While the Court acknowledged that past wrongs could be vital in
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arguing both that the complaint did allege past and continuing injury
sufficient to state a "case or controversy,"10 7 and perhaps more frankly,
that the allegations in the complaint were such that, if true, future injury
was near certain.' 0 8
And so, the equitable standing doctrine was born.
Two years later, the Supreme Court added some muscle to the doc-
trine, using it to strike down an injunction aimed at reforming a munici-
pal police department. In Rizzo v. Goode,"°9 a class of plaintiffs"o that
had at trial proved that systemic constitutional violations by Philadelphia
police officers went undisciplined and unchecked obtained a district
court injunctive order requiring the department to create "a comprehen-
sive program for improving the handling of citizen complaints alleging
police misconduct.""' This injunctive order was affirmed by the Third
determining whether the plaintiff has suffered "a real and immediate threat of repeated injury," it
found that in this case, "the prospect of future injury rests on the likelihood that respondents will
again be arrested for and charged with violations of the criminal law and will again be subjected to
bond proceedings, trial, or sentencing before petitioners." Id. at 496. The Court was unwilling to
assume that such injury would occur: "it seems to us that attempting to anticipate whether and
when these respondents will be charged with crime and will be made to appear before either
petitioner takes us into the area of speculation and conjecture." Id. at 497.
107. Id. at 506-09. The complaint alleged that "[defendants] continue to engage in a pattern
and practice which has deprived and continues to deprive the named plaintiffs and members of
their class of their constitutional rights." Id. at 508. These allegations and allegations that the
Cairo police commissioner continually denied constitutional rights to the plaintiffs "support the
likelihood that the named plaintiffs as well as members of their class will be arrested in the future
and therefore will be brought before [the defendants] and be subjected to the alleged
discriminatory practices in the administration of justice." Id. at 509.
108. See id. at 509 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
What has been alleged here is not only wrongs done to named plaintiffs, but a
recurring pattern of wrongs which establishes, if proved, that the legal regime under
control of the whites in Cairo, Illinois, is used over and over again to keep the
blacks from exercising First Amendment rights, to discriminate against them, to
keep from the blacks the protection of the law in their lawful activities, to weight the
scales of justice repeatedly on the side of white prejudices and against black
protests, fears, and suffering. This is a more pervasive scheme for suppression of
blacks and their civil rights than I have ever seen. It may not survive a trial. But if
this case does not present a 'case or controversy' involving the named plaintiffs,
then that concept has been so watered down as to be no longer recognizable.
Id.
109. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
110. As in O'Shea, the complaint alleged a "pervasive pattern of illegal and unconstitutional
mistreatment by police officers ... directed against minority citizens in particular and against all
Philadelphia residents in general." Id. at 366-67.
111. Id. at 365. The District Court made detailed findings of fact. First, the Court determined
that there had been sixteen incidents in Philadelphia over a one-year period in which police
officers violated citizens' constitutional rights, and citizen complaints had been filed in seven of
those sixteen. Id. at 368. In four of these cases, the police department received the complaints but
took no action against the offending officers. Id. The District Court also found evidence of a
departmental "tendency to discourage the filing of civilian complaints and to minimize the
consequences of police misconduct." Id. at 368-69.
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Circuit, which agreed with the district court that the existing procedures
for handling citizen complaints were "inadequate," so that the ordered
revisions "appeared to have the potential for prevention of future police
misconduct."" I2
Relying on its decision in O'Shea, the Supreme Court found that
plaintiffs in Rizzo lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because they
had not proved that the injuries they suffered in the past were likely to
recur; rather, plaintiffs' only claim was that "a small, unnamed minority
of policemen might" in the future cause them harm because these
officers would perceive that departmental disciplinary procedures were
so lax that their actions would go unchecked. 1 3 According to Justice
Rehnquist, "This hypothesis is even more attenuated than those allega-
tions of future injury found insufficient in O'Shea to warrant invocation
of federal jurisdiction."'1 4 Concluding that there had been no showing
that "the behavior of the Philadelphia police was different in kind or
degree from that which exists elsewhere. . ." because ". . . the problems
disclosed by the record ... are fairly typical of [those] afflicting police
departments in [most] major urban areas," the Court reversed and
vacated the injunctive order. 1 5 In dissent, once again, Justices Black-
mun, Brennan and Marshall argued that the plaintiffs had alleged (and
proved) that they were "injured by past unconstitutional conduct [of
defendant police officers] and fear[ed future] injury ...regardless of
Having made these findings, the court concluded that while only a small percentage of
officers commit violations of constitutional dimension, these simply "cannot be dismissed as rare,
isolated instances." COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1319 (E.D. Pa. 1973). As such, the
court determined that some judicial intervention was necessary, though a wholesale take-over of
the Department - as was urged by the plaintiffs - was a "drastic remedy" not called for, "at
least initially, in the present cases." Id. at 1320.
The court's injunctive order set out guidelines for the department that were "consistent with
generally recognized minimal standards," and, in the court's view, "impose[d] no substantial
burdens on the Police Department." Id. at 1321. Specifically, the court asked the department to
(1) revise the police manual and rules of procedure to spell out in detail the "dos and don'ts" of
permissible conduct in dealing with civilians; (2) make available forms for civilian complaints; (3)
establish a screening procedure for eliminating frivolous complaints; (4) establish a procedure for
prompt and adequate investigation of complaints; and (5) provide for adjudication of nonfrivolous
complaints "by an impartial individual or body, insulated so far as practicable from chain of
command pressures, with a fair opportunity afforded the complainant to present his complaint, and
to the police officer to present his defense." Id. This order was light, or, in the words of the
District Court, "more nearly in accord with the defendants' position than with the plaintiffs
position" and "did not go beyond what the defendants had always been willing to accept." Rizzo,
423 U.S. 362, 381 (quoting District Court's memorandum of December 18, 1973).
112. 506 F.2d 542, 548 (3d Cir. 1974).
113. I have argued that this allegation should make out a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C
§ 1983. See Myriam Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering "Custom" in Section
1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17 (2000).
114. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 372.
115. Id. at 375.
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whether they ...violated a valid law."' 16
Finally, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,"' the equitable standing
doctrine became a recognized theory of Article III jurisprudence. In
Lyons, the complaint alleged that police officers had unreasonably
applied a chokehold to a black motorist on a routine traffic stop,"' and
that LAPD officers routinely used the chokehold in nondangerous situa-
tions, often resulting in death or injury to the detainee." I 9 In addition to
monetary damages, Lyons sought equitable relief to enjoin the LAPD
from employing chokeholds where there is no threat of deadly force, and
obtained an order from the district court that resembled the structural
reform injunctions of times past.'2 °
Leaving intact Lyons's claim for monetary damages, the Supreme
Court reversed the grant of injunctive relief, finding plaintiff had "failed
to demonstrate a case or controversy with the City that would justify the
equitable relief sought."' 2'   Lyons's standing to seek such relief, the
Court held, depended on whether he himself is "realistically threatened
by a repetition of his experience"1 22 with the LAPD. To show actual
threat of future injury, Lyons "would have had not only to allege that he
would have another encounter with the police, but also to make the
incredible assertion . . .that all police officers in Los Angeles always
116. Id. at 383 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
117. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
118. Id. at 97-98. When the plaintiff, Adolph Lyons, exited his car after being pulled over for
a burned-out taillight, he encountered two LAPD officers with drawn revolvers who directed him
to face the vehicle, place his hands behind his head and spread his legs. Their pat-down search
revealed no weapons, but when Lyons began to lower his arms, one of the officers applied a
chokehold that rendered Lyons unconscious and permanently damaged his larynx. When Lyons
regained consciousness, he was on the ground spitting up blood and had urinated and defecated.
He could not speak, because of the damage to his larynx. The officers then gave him a ticket for
the burned-out taillight and let him go. Id. at 114-15.
119. When Lyons filed his original complaint, there had been at least two deaths resulting from
the application of chokeholds by the police. When he filed his first amended complaint a few
months later, at least 10 chokehold-related deaths had occurred. By May 1982, there had been
five more such deaths. Id. at 100. Of the sixteen known chokehold-related deaths, 75% were
black males, although only nine percent of the city's population consisted of black males. Id. at
116 n.3. Furthermore, the LAPD applied the chokehold more often than any other "control"
procedure over a period of five years: "[B]etween February 1975 and July 1980, LAPD officers
applied chokeholds on at least 975 occasions, which represented more than three-quarters of the
reported altercations" between citizens and police. Id.
120. Id. at 98-99. The district court found for plaintiff and enjoined use of the chokehold; the
court also ordered an improved police training program on the proper use of the chokehold, with
regular reporting and status hearings before the judge. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that
there was a sufficient likelihood that Lyons would again be stopped and subjected to the unlawful
use of force to confer standing and to warrant the issuance of an injunction. 656 F.2d 417 (9th
Cir. 1981).
121. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105.
122. Id. at 109.
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choke any citizen with whom they happen to have an encounter."1 23
This test requires a "virtual certainty" of personal, future injury to ensure
remedial effectiveness, and since Lyons could not show that an injunc-
tion barring future use of the chokehold would provide relief to him
personally, he had no standing to seek that remedy. 124
The Court's application of the "equitable standing" bar has ensured
that victims of police brutality will rarely, if ever, be allowed to enjoin
injurious police practices. But its effects are much broader: The Court's
equitable standing doctrine will doom many efforts to seek the type of
forward-looking, reformative injunctive relief that had been the hallmark
of the structural reform revolution. 125
The equitable standing doctrine, however, is not an impenetrable
barrier. Rather, it is a tool that courts may use to bar injunctive actions
that they do not wish to entertain. It is, in a conservative climate, a
barrier against liberal activism. To illustrate this point, I return to the
Supreme Court's decision in Gratz v. Bollinger, striking down the Uni-
versity of Michigan's undergraduate admissions program. 126
123. Id. at 105-06 (emphasis in original).
124. Id. The "virtual certainty" requirement of Lyons has drawn tremendous scholarly
criticism. See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, CONSTrrUTnONAL CHOICES 110, 117 (1985) (casting Lyons
as "anomalous," "extreme and unprecedented"); Richard Fallon, Of Justiciability, Remedies and
Public Law Litigation: Notes on The Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 29 (1988)
(arguing that the fundamental flaw in the Lyons majority's reasoning lies in its failure to analyze
the case under ordinary mootness principles); Linda E. Fisher, Caging Lyons: The Availability of
Injunctive Relief in § 1983 Actions, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1085, 1118 (1987) (concluding that
"Lyons unnecessarily limits the remedies available to those subjected to unconstitutional
conduct"); The Supreme Court - 1982 Term: I. Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 208, 219 (1983) (noting that Lyons was a "marked extension of the restrictive principles of
standing").
125. See, e.g., Knox v. McGinnis, 998 F.2d 1405, 1413 (7th Cir. 1993) (denying prisoner's
claim for injunctive relief to prohibit use of a restraining device called "the Black Box" because
prisoner could not show to a "virtual certainty" that he would again be restrained by prison
officials); Stewart v. Lubbock County, 767 F.2d 153, 155 (5th Cir. 1985) (questioning sua sponte
the standing of plaintiffs challenging sheriff department strip search policy on grounds that
plaintiffs "may not be able to show that they would again be arrested and therefore be again
subject to the unconstitutional strip search policy"); Curtis v. City of New Haven, 726 F.2d 65 (2d
Cir. 1984) (finding that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek injunction against use of mace by city
police department where there was no showing that plaintiffs were likely to again suffer mace
assault). See also Laura L. Little, It's About Time: Unravelling Standing and Equitable Ripeness,
41 BUFF. L. REV. 933, 942 (1993) (discussing cases denying plaintiffs injunctive relief against
unconstitutional police practices under Lyons).
126. 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003); see also supra text accompanying notes 50-58. While I focus on
the Supreme Court's recent decisions in the Michigan affirmative action cases, other lower federal
court decisions striking down admissions policies that employ race as a factor are also susceptible
to this critique. See, e.g., Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 154-55 (4th Cir. 1994), Hopwood
v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 952-53 (5th Cir. 1996); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga, 263
F.3d 1234 (11 th Cir. 2001).
[Vol. 58:143
STRUCTURAL REFORM INJUNCTION
B. Conservative Efforts To Engage in Structural Reform
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Gratz begins by
addressing the argument that the petitioners lacked standing to bring the
action. Specifically, the petitioners had already enrolled at other schools
before they filed the case, and neither petitioner was in the process of
reapplying to Michigan through the freshman admissions process (the
admission policy at issue) at the time this suit was filed or at any time
thereafter. Based on these facts, it seemed that the equitable standing
doctrine should bar the claim for injunctive relief because petitioners
had not shown to a "virtual certainty" that they would suffer similar
injury - rejection from the Michigan undergraduate program - in the
future; 27 indeed, they were virtually certain never to suffer similar harm
given that college graduates rarely reapply to college.1 28
As Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, the record contained "not
a scintilla of evidence that the freshman admissions program now being
administered by respondents will ever have any impact on either [Peti-
tioner] Hamacher or Gratz."129 One of the petitioners, Hamacher, thus
sought to base his claim for injunctive relief on an intent to reapply to
the university as a transfer student. 3 ' As Justice Stevens observed
through tracking the language of the Court's equitable standing jurispru-
dence, Hamacher's "claim of future injury is at best 'conjectural or
hypothetical' rather than 'real and immediate."" 31
Justice Rehnquist disagreed, finding that petitioners clearly had
standing to seek injunctive relief. In a striking departure from the
Court's equitable standing jurisprudence, Rehnquist found that "whether
127. This stands in stark contrast to the claim of Barbara Grutter, who, in challenging the use
of race in admissions at Michigan's law school, alleged that she "has not attended any other law
school" and that she "still desires to attend the [Michigan] Law School and become a lawyer."
Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2434 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting). It may also be
distinguishable from "Allan Bakke's single-minded pursuit of a medical education from the
University of California at Davis." Id. at 2435.
128. Similarly, under a literal interpretation of Lyons, the Bakke case would not have been
justiciable because the plaintiff, a white male who had been denied admission to medical school
because of a policy requiring that a set number of minority applicants be admitted, would not have
been able to demonstrate with certainty that he would be admitted to a future class but for the
admission policy. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrITMONAL LAW §§ 3-14, at 116-17
(2d ed. 1988). See also Michael Rosman, The Error of Hopwood's Error, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 355,
357 (2000) (noting that Justice Powell "never quite explains why Allan Bakke was the appropriate
individual to seek a systemic injunction.").
129. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2435 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. One commentator raised a similar point concerning the Bakke decision, "[i]f Allan Bakke
was never going to apply to Davis Medical School again (because he was going to be admitted if
the system was illegal), what standing did he have to seek an injunction?" Rosman, supra note
124, at 357.
131. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2436 (Stevens, J., dissenting), citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.
488, 494 (1974).
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Hamacher 'actually applied' for admission as a transfer student is not
determinative of his ability to seek injunctive relief in this case," rather,
all he need allege is "an intent to apply again in order to seek prospec-
tive relief."'' 3' Because the complaint alleges that Hamacher "intends to
transfer to the University of Michigan when defendants cease the use of
race as an admission preference," he has standing to seek injunctive
relief to force defendants to do SO. 133
In the caustic words of a dissenting Judge Souter in Gratz, only the
majority's "new gloss on the law of standing" allowed it to reach the
merits of the case. 134 Having reached the merits in Gratz and Grutter,
moreover, the Court essentially announced a set of rules by which state
institutions must conduct their business so as to adhere to constitutional
norms.
Not unlike the judicial prescriptions and proscriptions that gov-
erned crowded prisons and segregated schools, the Court has now
addressed the manner in which admissions committees may, or may not,
handle "soft variables,' ''point systems," "plus-factors" and "critical
masses of underrepresented minorities," among other things (not to men-
tion the multi-factor "Harvard Plan," which the Court has now endorsed,
notwithstanding that it has never been before the Court for review 35).
To be sure, the Court stopped well short of attaching federal
monitors to state collegiate admissions committees. Nor did the Court
purport to effect the wholesale reformation of higher educational admis-
sions. This does not suggest, however, that conservative ideologues lack
the requisite fire in the belly to overhaul state admissions procedures.
The conservatives' willingness to abandon standing and federalism con-
cerns reflects an impressive level of commitment; depth of passion is not
lacking here. Instead, the would-be overhaulers were hindered by the
Court's internal ideological battles. What is lacking is breadth of
consensus.
Still, the Court's actions in Gratz and Grutter are oddly redolent of
the golden age of Brown. Gone, for the moment, are the restrictive
standing doctrines designed to keep reformist litigants from the court-
house. Gone, for now, is the archetype of the judicial antihero (the anti-
Fiss?), devoid of substantive social opinions and resolutely opposed to
meddling in the operation of state and local institutions. And back, for
132. Id. at 2422.
133. Id. Rehnquist buttresses this with Hamacher's second request for relief: that the District
Court "[r]equir[ej the [College] to offer [him] admission as a transfer student." Id. at 2418.
134. Id. at 2438 (Souter, J., dissenting).
135. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1262 (11 th Cir. 2001)
(noting that Powell's discussion of the Harvard Plan in Bakke was entirely dicta).
[Vol. 58:143
2003] STRUCTURAL REFORM INJUNCTION 171
today, are the passions that inspire crowds to gather on New Jersey Ave-
nue, outside the front entrance of the Supreme Court.
It's almost enough to make Owen Fiss proud.
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